Saturday 4 July 2009

Wealth Evolution and Distorted Financial Forecasts

Abstract

Evolutionary metaphors have been prominent in both economics and finance.  They are often used as basic foundations for rational behavior and efficient markets. Theoretically, a mechanism which selects for rational investors actually requires many caveats, and is far from generic.  This paper tests wealth based evolution in a simple, stylized agent-based financial market.   The setup borrows extensively from current research in finance that considers optimal behavior with some amount of return predictability.  The results confirm that with a homogeneous world of log utility investors wealth will converge onto optimal adaptive forecasting parameters. However, in the case of utility functions which differ from log, wealth selection alone converges to parameters which are economically far from the optimal forecast parameters.  This serves as a strong reminder that wealth selection and utility maximization are not the same thing.   Therefore, suboptimal financial forecasting strategies may be difficult to drive out of a market, and may even do quite well for some time.

Full Text of "Wealth Evolution and Distorted Financial Forecasts" (PDF, 294 KB)
You must have Adobe Acrobat installed to view this document.


Printer Friendly Version | Send to a Friend

Talk Papers (.pdf)
A Field Experiment on Bargaining
An Experimental Investigation of Delegation, Voting, and the Provision of Public Goods
Are Smarter Groups More Cooperative? Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments, 1959-2003
Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model
Did the Soviets Collude? A Statistical Analysis of Championship Chess 1940-64
Do You Know That I Am Biased? An experiment
Exploring the link of ecological rationality between ICES and ABC - Abstract
Figures and tables 15.0
Money, Happiness, and Aspirations: An Experimental Study
Name-your-own-price Mechanisms: Revenue Gain or Drain?
new pdf schedule
Post Conflict
Price Dynamics in an Exchange Economy
Recall Errors in Surveys
Recall Errors in Surveys
Self-interest through agency: An alternative rationale for the principal-agent relationship
Then and Now: Reality and Perceptions in the Evolution of Online and Offline Retail Pricing
Trust and Reciprocity in 2-node and 3-node Networks
Using Experimental Economics to Measure the Effects of A Natural Educational Experiment on Altruism
Using Incentive Preserving Rebates to Increase Acceptance of Critical Peak Electricity Pricing
Wealth Evolution and Distorted Financial Forecasts
When Bioterrorism was No Big Deal
When Bioterrorism was No Big Deal
Wired for Survival: Human Nature, Lawgivers, and other Wifemen
 


ICES
George Mason University
3330 Washington Blvd.,
Arlington, VA 22201
703.993.4850
fax: 703.993.4851
email: yganeva@gmu.edu
Privacy Policy